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This paper proposes to determine a suﬃcient number of images for reliable classification and to use feature selection to select most
relevant features for achieving reliable steganalysis. First dimensionality issues in the context of classification are outlined, and the
impact of the diﬀerent parameters of a steganalysis scheme (the number of samples, the number of features, the steganography
method, and the embedding rate) is studied. On one hand, it is shown that, using Bootstrap simulations, the standard deviation
of the classification results can be very important if too small training sets are used; moreover a minimum of 5000 images is
needed in order to perform reliable steganalysis. On the other hand, we show how the feature selection process using the OP-ELM
classifier enables both to reduce the dimensionality of the data and to highlight weaknesses and advantages of the six most popular
steganographic algorithms.
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1. Introduction
Steganography has been known and used for a very long
time, as a way to exchange information in an unnoticeable
manner between parties, by embedding it in another,
apparently innocuous, document.
Nowadays steganographic techniques are mostly used
on digital content. The online newspaper Wired News
reported in one of its articles [1] on steganography
that several steganographic contents have been found on
web sites with very large image database such as eBay.
Provos and Honeyman [2] have somewhat refuted these
facts by analyzing and classifying two million images from
eBay and one million from USENet network and not finding
any steganographic content embedded in these images.
This could be due to many reasons, such as very low
payloads, making the steganographic images less detectable
to steganalysis and hence more secure.
In practice the concept of security for steganography is
diﬃcult to define, but Cachin in [3] mentions a theoretic way
to do so, based on the Kullback-Leibler divergence. A stego
process is thus defined as -secure if the Kullback-Leibler
divergence δ between the probability density functions of the
cover document pcover and those of this very same content






The process is called secure if  = 0, and in this case the
steganography is perfect, creating no statistical diﬀerences by
the embedding of the message. Steganalysis would then be
impossible.
Fortunately, such high performance for a steganographic
algorithm is hardly achievable when the payload (the
embedded information) is of nonnegligible size; also, several
schemes have weaknesses.
One way of measuring the payload is the embedding rate,
defined as follows.
Let A be a steganographic algorithm, and let C be a cover
medium. A, by its design, claims that it can embed at most
TMax information bits within C; TMax is called the capacity
of the medium and highly depends on the steganographic
(stego) algorithm as well as the cover medium itself. The












Figure 1: Overview of the typical global processing for an analyzed image: features are first extracted from the image and then processed
through a classifier to decide whether the image is cover or stego. In the proposed processing is added an extra step aimed at reducing the
features number and having an additional interpretability of the steganalysis results, by doing a feature selection.
embedding rate T is then defined as the part of TMax used
by the information to embed.
ForTi bits to embed in the cover medium, the embedding
rate is then T = Ti/TMax, usually expressed as percentage.
There are other ways to measure the payload and the
relationship between the amount of information embedded
and the cover medium, such as the number of bits per nonzero
coeﬃcient. Meanwhile, the embedding rate has the advantage
of taking into account the stego algorithm properties and
is not directly based on the cover medium properties—
since it uses the stego algorithm estimation of the maximum
capacity. Hence the embedding rate has been chosen for this
analysis of stego schemes.
This paper is focused onto feature-based steganalysis.
Such steganalysis typically uses a certain amount of images
for training a classifier: features are extracted from the
images and fed to a binary classifier (usually Support Vector
Machines) for training. The output of this classifier is “stego”
(modified using a steganographic algorithm) or “cover”
(genuine). This process is illustrated on Figure 1 for the part
without parenthesis.
The emphasis in this paper is more specifically on the
issues related to the increasing number of features, which are
linked to the universal steganalyzers. Indeed, the very first
examples of LSB-based steganalysis made use of less than
ten features, with an adapted and specific methodology for
each stego algorithm. The idea of “universal steganalyzers”
then became popular. In 1999, Westfeld proposes a χ2-based
method, on the LSB of DCT coeﬃcients [4]. Five years
after, Fridrich in [5] uses a set of 23 features obtained by
normalizations of a much larger set, whilst Lyu and Farid
already proposed in 2002 a set of 72 features [6]. Some
feature sets [7] also have variable size depending on the DCT
block sizes. Since then, an increasing number of research
works use supervised learning-based classifiers in very high-
dimensional spaces. The recent work of Shi et al. [8] is an
example of an eﬃcient result by using 324 features based on
JPEG blocks diﬀerences modeled by Markov processes.
These new feature sets usually do achieve better and
better performance in terms of detection rate and enable
to detect most stego algorithm for most embedding rates.
Meanwhile, there are some side-eﬀects to this growing
number of features. It has been shown, for example, in [9]
that the feature space dimensionality in which the considered
classifier is trained can have a significant impact on its
performances: a too small amount of images regarding
dimensionality (the number of features) might lead to an
improper training of the classifier and thus to results with
a possibly high statistical variance.
In this paper is addressed the idea of a practical way
of comparing steganalysis schemes in terms of performance
reliability. Ker proposed [10] such comparison by focusing
on the pdf of one output of the classifier. Here are studied
multiple parameters that can influence this performance:
(1) the number of images used during the training of
the classifier: how to determine a suﬃcient number
of images for an eﬃcient and reliable classification
(meaning that final results have acceptable variance)?
(2) the number of features used: what are the suﬃcient
and most relevant features for the actual classification
problem?
(3) the steganographic method: is there an important
influence of the stego algorithm on the general
methodology?
(4) the embedding rate used: does the embedding rate
used for the steganography modify the variance of
the results and the retained best features (by feature
selection)?
It can also be noted that images of higher sizes would
lead to a smaller secure steganographic embedding rate
(following a root-square law), but this phenomenon has
already been studied by Filler et al. [11].
The next section details some of the problems related
to the number of features used (dimensionality issues) and
commonly encountered in steganalysis: (1) the empty space
and the distance concentration phenomena, (2) the large
variance of the results obtained by the classifier whenever
the number of images used for training is not suﬃcient
regarding the number of features, and finally, (3) the lack of
interpretability of the results because of the high number of
features. In order to address these issues, the methodology
sketched on Figure 1 is used and more thoroughly detailed: a
suﬃcient number of images regarding the number of features
is first established so that the classifier’s training is “reliable”
in terms of variance of its results; then, using feature selection
the interpretability of the results is improved.
The methodology is finally tested in Section 4 with
six diﬀerent stego algorithms, each using four diﬀerent
embedding rates. Results are finally interpreted thanks to
the most relevant selected features for each stego algorithm.
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A quantitative study of selected features combinations is then
provided.
2. Dimensionality Issues and Methodology
The common term “curse of dimensionality” [12] refers to a
wide range of problems related to a high number of features.
Some of these dimensionality problems are considered in
the following, in relation with the number of images and
features.
2.1. Issues Related to the Number of Images
2.1.1. The Need for Data Samples. In order to illustrate this
problem in a low-dimensional case, one can consider four
samples in a two-dimensional space (corresponding to four
images out of which two features have been extracted); the
underlying structure leading to the distribution of these four
samples seems impossible to infer, and so is the creation of a
model for it. Any model claiming it can properly explain the
distribution of these samples will behave erratically (because
it will extrapolate) when a new sample is introduced. On
the contrary, with hundreds to thousands of samples it
becomes possible to see clusters and relationships between
dimensions.
More generally, in order for any tool to be able to analyze
and find a structure within the data, the number of needed
samples is growing exponentially with the dimensionality.
Indeed, consider a d-dimensional unit side hypercube; the
number of samples needed to fill the Cartesian grid of step
 inside of it is growing as O((1/)d). Thus using a common
grid of step 1/10 in dimension 10, it requires 1010 samples to
fill the grid.
Fortunately, for a model to be built over some high-
dimensional data, that data does not have to fill the whole
space in the sense of the Cartesian grid. The required space
to fill highly depends on the density to be estimated.
In practice, most data sets in steganalysis use at least 10
to 20 dimensions, implying a “needed” number of samples
impossible to achieve: storing and processing such number of
images is currently impossible. As a consequence, the feature
space is not filled with enough data samples to estimate
the density with reliable accuracy, which can give wrong
or high variance models while building classifiers, having
to extrapolate for the missing samples: obtained results can
have rather high confidence interval and hence be statistically
irrelevant. A claim of performance improvement of 2% using
a specific classifier/steganalyzer/steganographic scheme with
a variance of 2% is rather meaningless.
2.1.2. The Increasing Variance of the Results. The construc-
tion of a proper and reliable model for steganalysis is
also related to the variance of the results it obtains. Only
experimental results are provided to support this claim: with
a low number of images regarding the number of features
(e.g., a few hundreds of images for 200 features), the variance
of the classifier’s results can be very important (i.e., the
variance of the detection probability).
When the number of images increases, this variance
decreases toward low enough values for feature-based ste-
ganalysis and performances comparisons. These claims are
verified in the next section with the experiments.
2.1.3. Proposed Solution to the Lack of Images. Overall, these
two problems lead to the same conclusion: the number
of images has to be important regarding dimensionality.
Theory states that this number is exponential with the
number of features, which is impossible to reach for feature-
based steganalysis. Hence, the first step of the proposed
methodology is to find a “suﬃcient” number of images for
the number of features used, according to a criterion on the
variance of the results.
A Bootstrap [13] is proposed for that task: the number
of images used for the training of the classifier is increased,
and for each diﬀerent number of images, the variance of the
results of the classifier is assessed. Once the variance of the
classifier is below a certain threshold, a suﬃcient number
of images have been found (regarding the classifier and the
feature set used).
2.2. Issues Related to the Number of Features
2.2.1. The Empty Space Phenomenon. This phenomenon that
was first introduced by Scott and Thompson [14] can be
explained with the following example: draw samples from
a normal distribution (zero mean and unit variance) in
dimension d, and consider the probability to have a sample
at distance r from the mean of the distribution (zero). It is
given by the probability density function:







having its maximum at r = √d − 1. Thus, when dimension
increases, samples are getting farther from the mean of
the distribution. A direct consequence of this is that, for
the previously mentioned hypercube in dimension d, the
“center” of it will tend to be empty, since samples are getting
concentrated in the borders and corners of the cube.
Therefore, whatever model is used in such a feature space
will be trained on scattered samples which are not filling the
feature space at all. The model will then not be proper for
any sample falling in an area of the space where the classifier
had no information about during the training. It will have to
extrapolate its behavior for these empty areas and will have
unstable performances.
2.2.2. Lack of Interpretability for Possible “Reverse Engineer-
ing”. The interpretability (and its applications) is an impor-
tant motivation for feature selection and dimensionality
reduction: high performances can indeed be reached using
the whole 193 features set used in this paper for classification.
Meanwhile, if we are looking for the weaknesses and reasons
why these features react vividly to a specific algorithm, it
seems rather impossible on this important set.
Reducing the required number of features to a small
amount through feature selection enables to understand





Figure 2: Scheme of the possible reverse engineering on an
unknown stego algorithm, by using feature selection for identifi-
cation of the specific weaknesses.
better why a steganographic model is weak on these par-
ticular details, highlighted by the selected features. Such
analysis is performed in Section 4.3 for all six steganographic
algorithms.
Through the analysis of these selected features, one can
consider a “reverse engineering” of the stego algorithm as
illustrated on Figure 2. By the identification of the most
relevant features, the main characteristics of the embedding
method can be inferred, and the steganographic algorithm
can be identified if known, or simply understood.
2.2.3. Proposed Solution to the High Number of Features.
These two issues motivate the feature selection process: if
one can reduce the number of features (and hence the
dimensionality), the empty space phenomena will have a
reduced impact on the classifier used. Also, the set of features
obtained by the feature selection process will give insights on
the stego scheme and its possible weaknesses.
For this matter, a classical feature selection technique has
been used as the second step of the proposed methodology.
The following methodology is diﬀerent from the one
presented previously in [15, 16]. Indeed, in this article, the
goal is set toward statistically reliable results. Also, feature
selection has the advantage of reducing the dimensionality
of the data (the number of features), making the classifier’s
training much easier. The interpretation of the selected
features is also an important advantage (compared to having
only the classifier’s performance) in that it gives insights on
the weaknesses of the stego algorithm.
3. Methodology for Benchmarking of
Steganographic Schemes
Addressed Problems. The number of data points to be used
for building a model and classification is clearly an issue, and
in the practical case, how many points are needed in order to
obtain accurate results—meaning results with small standard
deviation.
Reduction of complexity is another main addressed
concern in this framework. Then for the selected number
of points to be used for classification and also the initial
dimensionality given by the features set, two main steps
remain.
(i) Choosing the feature selection technique. Since anal-
ysis and computation can hardly be done on the
whole set of features, the technique used to reduce
the dimensionality has to be selected.
(ii) Building a classifier. This implies choosing it, select-
ing its parameters, training, and validating the chosen
model.
The following paragraphs presents the solutions for these
two major issues, leading to a methodology combining them,
presented on Figure 3.
3.1. Presentation of the Classifier Used: OP-ELM. The Opti-
mally-Pruned Extreme Learning Machine (OP-ELM [17,
18]) is a classifier based on the original Extreme Learning
Machine (ELM) of Huang et al. [19] (available at: http://
www.cis.hut.fi/projects/tsp/index.php?page=OPELM). This
classifier makes use of single hidden layer feedforward neural
networks (SLFNs) for which the weights and biases are
randomly initialized. The goal of the ELM is to reduce
the length of the learning process for the neural network,
usually very long (e.g., if using classical back-propagation
algorithms). The two main theorems on which ELM is based
will not be discussed here but can be found in [19]. Figure 4
illustrates the typical structure of an SLFN (simplified to a
few neurons in here).
Supposing the neural network is approximating the
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)
= y j , j ∈ 1,N, (3)
where N is the number of inputs X = (x1, . . . , xN ) (number
of images in our case), and M is the number of neurons in the
hidden layer. In the case of steganalysis as performed in this
article, xi denotes the feature vector corresponding to image
i, while yi is the corresponding class of the image (i.e., stego
or cover).
As said, the novelty introduced by the ELM is to
initialize the weights W and biases B randomly. OP-ELM,
in comparison to ELM, brings a greater robustness to data
with possibly dependent/correlated features. Also, the use
of other functions f (activation functions of the neural
network) makes it possible to use OP-ELM for the case where
linear components have an important contribution in the
classifier’s model, for example.
The validation step of this classifier is performed using
classical Leave-One-Out cross-validation, much more precise
than a k-fold cross-validation and hence not requiring any
test step [13]. It has been shown on many experiments
[17, 18] that the OP-ELM classifier has results very close to
the ones of a Support Vector Machine (SVM) while having
computational times much smaller (usually from 10 to 100
times).
3.2. Determination of a Suﬃcient Number of Images. A proper
number of images, regarding the number of features, has to
be determined. Since theoretical values for that number are
not reachable, a suﬃcient number regarding a low enough
value of the variance of the results is taken instead (standard
deviation will be used instead of variance, in the following).
The OP-ELM classifier is hence used along with a
Bootstrap algorithm [13] over 100 repetitions; a subset of the
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Figure 3: Schematic view of the proposed methodology. (1) An appropriate number of data samples to work with are determined using
a Bootstrap method for statistical stability. (2) The Forward selection is performed using an OP-ELM classifier to find a good features set,













Figure 4: Structure of a classical Single Layer Feedforward Neural
Network (SLFN). The input values (the data) X = (x1, . . . , xN ) are
weighted by the W coeﬃcients. A possible bias B (not on the figure)
can be added to the weighted inputs wixi. An activation function f
taking this weighted inputs (plus bias) as input is finally weighted
by output coeﬃcients β to obtain the output Y = (y1, . . . , yN ).
complete data set (10000 images, 193 features) is randomly
drawn (with possible repetitions). The classifier is trained
with that specific subset. This process is repeated 100 times
(100 random drawings of the subset) to obtain a statistically
reliable estimation of the standard deviation of the results.
The size of the subset drawn from the complete data set is
then increased, and the 100 iterations are repeated for this
new subset size.
The criterion to stop this process is a threshold on the
value of the standard deviation of the results. Once the
standard deviation of the results gets lower than 1%, it is
decided that the subset size S, is suﬃcient. S is then used for
the rest of the experiments as a suﬃcient number of images
regarding the number of features in the feature set.
3.3. Dimensionality Reduction: Feature Selection by Forward
with OP-ELM. Given the suﬃcient number of images for
reliable training of the classifier, S, feature selection can be
performed. The second step of the methodology, a Forward
algorithm with OP-ELM (Figure 3), is used.
3.3.1. The Forward Algorithm. The forward selection algo-
rithm is a greedy algorithm [20]; it selects one by one
the dimensions, trying to find the one that combines best
with the already selected ones. The algorithm is detailed in
Algorithm 1 (with xi denoting the ith dimension of the data
set).
Algorithm 1 requires d(d−1)/2 instances to terminate (to
be compared to the 2d−1 instances for an exhaustive search),
which might reach the computational limits, depending
R = {xi, i ∈ 1,d}
S = ∅
while R /=∅ do
for x j ∈ R do
Evaluate performance with S∪ x j
end for
Set S = S∪ {xk}, R = R− xk with xk the dimension
giving the best result in the loop
end while
Algorithm 1: Forward.
Table 1: Performances for OP-ELM LOO for the best features
set along with the size of the reduced feature set (number).
Performances using the reduced set are within the 1% range of
standard deviation of the best results. The size of the set has been
determined to be the smallest possible one giving this performance.
5% Number 10% Number
F5 73.3 46 83.9 38
JPHS 90.7 41 92.1 21
MBSteg 63.3 57 70.9 93
MM3 78.00 81 86.2 49
OutGuess 81.2 65 93.2 49
Steghide 82.3 149 91.2 89
15% Number 20% Number
F5 90.5 33 96.3 15
JPHS 93.7 41 97.3 25
MBSteg 83.5 73 88.5 69
MM3 86.6 57 86.6 73
OutGuess 98.8 33 100.0 29
Steghide 96.4 73 99 73
on the number of dimensions and time to evaluate the
performance with one set. With the OP-ELM as a classifier,
computational times for the Forward selection are not much
of an issue.
Even if its capacity to isolate eﬃcient features is clear, the
Forward technique has some drawbacks. First, if two features
present good results when they are put together but poor
results if only one of them is selected, Forward might not take
these into account in the selection process.
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(f) StegHide
Figure 5: Standard deviation in percentage of the average classification result versus the number of images, for all six steganographic
algorithms, for the four embedding rates: black circles ( ) for 20%, green squares ( ) for 15%, red crosses ( ) for 10%, and blue triangles
( ) for 5%. These estimations have been performed with the Bootstrap runs (100 iterations). Plots do not have the same scale, vertically.

























































































































































0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
(f) StegHide
Figure 6: Performance in detection for all six stego algorithms versus the number of features, for the four embedding rates: black circles ( )
for 20%, green squares ( ) for 15%, red crosses ( ) for 10%, and blue triangles ( ) for 5%. Features are ranked using the Forward selection
algorithm. These plots are the result of a single run of the Forward algorithm. Plots do not have the same scale, vertically.
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Table 2: The 23 features previously detailed.
Functional/Feature Functional F
Global histogram H/‖H‖




Dual histogram for 11 DCT
values
g−5/‖g−5‖, g−4/‖g−4‖, . . .,
g4/‖g4‖, g5/‖g5‖
Variation V
L1 and L2 blockiness B1, B2
Cooccurrence N00, N01, N11
Second, it does not allow to “go back” in the process,
meaning that if performances are decreasing along the selec-
tion process, and that the addition of another feature makes
performances increase again, combinations of previously
selected features with this last one are not possible anymore.
The Forward selection is probably not the best possible
feature selection technique, and recent contribution to these
techniques such as Sequential Floating Forward Selection
(SFFS) [21] and improvements of it [22] has shown that
the number of computations required for feature selection
can be reduced drastically. Nevertheless, the feature selection
using Forward has been showing very good results and
seems to perform well on the feature set used in this
paper. It is not used here in the goal of obtaining the best
possible combination of features but more to reduce the
dimensionality and obtain some meaning out of the selected
features. Improvements of this methodology could make use
of such more eﬃcient techniques of feature selection.
3.4. General Methodology. To summarize the general meth-
odology on Figure 3 uses first a Bootstrap with 100 iterations
on varying subsets sizes, to obtain a suﬃcient subset size
and statistically reliable classifiers’ results regarding the
number of features used. With this number of images feature
selection is performed using a Forward selection algorithm;
this enables to highlight possible weaknesses of the stego
algorithm.
This methodology has been applied to six popular stego
algorithms for testing. Experiments and results as well as a
discussion on the analysis of the selected features are given in
the next section.
4. Experiments and Results
4.1. Experiments Setup
4.1.1. Steganographic Algorithms Used. Six diﬀerent stegano-
graphic algorithms have been used: F5 [23], Model-Based
(MBSteg) [24], MMx [25] (in these experiments, MM3 has
been used), JP Hide and Seek [26], OutGuess [27], and
StegHide [28]; all of them with four diﬀerent embedding
rates: 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20%.
4.1.2. Generation of Image Database. The image base was
constituted of 10 000 images from the BOWS2 Challenge
[29] database (hosted by Westfeld [30]). These images are
512× 512 PGM greyscale (also available in color).
The steganographic algorithms and the proposed
methodology for dimensionality reduction and steganalysis
are only performed on these 512 × 512 images. It can also
be noted that depending on image complexity, as studied
in [31], local discrepancies might be observed (a classically
trained steganalyzer might have troubles for such images),
but on a large enough base of images, this behavior will not
be visible.
4.1.3. Extraction of the Features. In the end, the whole set
of images is separated in two equal parts: one is kept as
untouched cover while the other one is stego with the six
steganographic algorithms at four diﬀerent embedding rates:
5%, 10%, 15%, and 20%. Fridrich’s 193 DCT features [32]
have been used for the steganalysis.
4.2. Results. Results are presented following the method-
ology steps. A discussion over the selected features and
the possible interpretability of it are developed afterward.
In the following, the term “detection rate” stands for the
performance of the classifier on a scale from 0% to 100% of
classification rate. It is a measure of the performance instead
of a measure of error.
4.2.1. Determination of Suﬃcient Number of Samples. Pre-
sented first is the result of the evaluation of a suﬃcient num-
ber of images, as explained in the previous methodology, in
Figure 5. The Bootstrap (100 rounds) is used on randomly
taken subsets of 200 up to 9000 images out of the whole
10 000 from the BOWS2 challenge.
It can be seen on Figure 5 that the standard deviation
behaves as expected when increasing the number of images
for the cases of JPHS, MBSteg, MMx, OutGuess, and
StegHide: its value decreases and tends to be below 1% of
the best performance when the number of images is 5000
(even if for MBSteg with embedding rate of 5% it is a bit
above 1%). This suﬃcient number of samples is kept as the
reference and suﬃcient number. Another important point is
that with very low number of images (100 in these cases),
the standard deviation is between 1% and about 6.5% of
the average classifier’s performance; meaning that results
computed with small number of images have at most a
±6.5% confidence interval. While the plots decrease very
quickly when increasing the number of images, values of the
standard deviation remain very high until 2000 images; these
results have to take into account the embedding rate, which
tends to make the standard deviation higher as it decreases.
Indeed, while diﬀerences between 15% and 20% embed-
ding rates are not very important on the four previously
mentioned stego algorithms, there is a gap between the
5%–10% plots and the 20% ones. This is expected when
looking at the performances of the steganalysis process:
low embedding rates tend to be harder to detect, leading
to a range of possible performances wider than with high
embedding rates. Figure 6 illustrates this idea on all six cases
(F5, JPHS, MMx, MBSteg, StegHide, and OutGuess).
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The final “suﬃcient” number of samples retained for
the second step of the methodology—the feature selection—
is 5000, for two reasons: first, the computational times are
acceptable for the following computations (feature selection
step with training of classifier for each step); second, the
standard deviation is small enough to consider that the final
classification results are given with at most 1% of standard
deviation (in the case of MBSteg at 5% of embedding rate).
4.2.2. Forward Feature Selection. Features have first been
ranked, using the Forward feature selection algorithm, and
detection rates are plotted with increasing number of features
(using the ranking provided by the Forward selection) on
Figure 6.
The six analyzed stego algorithms give rather diﬀerent
results.
(i) F5 reaches very quickly the maximum performance
for all embedding rates: only few features contribute
to the overall detection rate.
(ii) JPHS reaches a plateau in performance (within the
standard deviation of 1%) for all embedding rates
with 41 features and remains around that perfor-
mance.
(iii) OutGuess has this same plateau at 25 features,
and performances are not increasing anymore above
that number of features (still within the standard
deviation of the results).
(iv) StegHide can be considered to have reached the
maximum result (within the standard deviation
interval) at 60 features.
(v) In the MM3 case, performances for embedding rates
10%, 15%, and 20% are very similar as are selected
features. Performances stable at 40 features. The
diﬀerence for the 5% case is most likely due to matrix
embedding which makes detection harder when the
payload is small.
(vi) Performances for MBSteg are stable using 70 fea-
tures for embedding rates 15% and 20%. Only 30
are enough for embedding rate 5%. The case of
embedding rate 10% has the classifier’s performances
increasing with the addition of features.
Interestingly, the features retained by the Forward selec-
tion for each embedding rate diﬀer slightly within one
steganographic algorithm. Details about the features ranked
as first by the Forward algorithm are discussed afterward.
4.3. Discussion. First, the global performances, when using
the reduced and suﬃcient feature sets mentioned in the
results section above, are assessed. Note that feature selection
for performing reverse engineering of a steganographic
algorithm is theoretically eﬃcient only if the features are
carrying diﬀerent information (if two features represent the
same information, the feature selection will select only one
of them).
4.3.1. Reduced Features Sets. Based on the ranking of the
features obtained by the Forward algorithm, it has been
decided that once performances were within 1% of the best
performance obtained (among all Forward tryouts for all
diﬀerent sets of features), the number of features obtained
was retained as a “suﬃcient” feature set. Performances
using reduced feature sets (proper to each algorithm and
embedding rate) are first compared in Table 1. It can be
seen that, globally, the required size of the set of features for
remaining within 1% of the best performance decreases.
It should be noted that since the aim of the feature
selection is to reduce as much as possible the feature set while
keeping overall same performance, it is expected that within
the standard deviation interval the performance with the
lowest possible number of features is behind the “maximum”
one.
It remains possible, for the studied algorithms, as
Figure 6 shows, to find a higher number of features for which
the performance is closer or equal to the maximum one—
even though this is very disputable, considering the maximal
1% standard deviation interval when using 5000 images.
But this is not the goal of the feature selection step of the
methodology.
4.4. Feature Sets Analysis for Reverse Engineering. Common
feature sets have been selected according to the following
rule: take the first common ten features (in the order ranked
by the Forward algorithm) to each feature set obtained for
each embedding rate (within one algorithm). It is hoped that
through this selection the obtained features will be generic
regarding the embedding rate.
We recall first the meaning of the diﬀerent features used
in this steganalysis scheme. Notations for the feature set used
[32] are given for the original 23 features set, in Table 2.
This set of 23 features is expanded up to a set of 193,
by removing the L1 norm used previously and keeping all
the values of the matrices and vectors. This results in the
following 193 features set.
(i) A global histogram of 11 dimensions H(i), i =
−5, 5.
(ii) 5 low frequency DCT histograms each of 11 dimen-
sions h21(i) · · ·h31(i), i = −5, 5.
(iii) 11 dual histograms each of 9 dimensions
g−5(i) · · · g5(i), i = 1, 9.
(iv) Variation between blocks, of dimension 1 V .
(v) 2 blockinesses of dimension 1 B1, B2.
(vi) Cooccurrence matrix of dimensions 5 × 5 Ci, j , i =
−2, 2, j = −2, 2.
The following is a discussion on the selected features for
each steganographic algorithm.
Tables of selected feature sets are presented in Tables
3–8, with an analysis for each algorithm. Fridrich’s DCT
features are not the only ones having a possible physical
interpretation. They have been chosen here because it is
believed that most of the features can be interpreted. The
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Table 3: Common feature set for F5 with average rank for each
feature.
B1 C−1,−1 C−2,0 H(0) B2
(4) (8) (12) (13) (19)
V g0(1) h22(−3) h12(3) h13(−3)
(21) (22) (26) (31) (55)
Table 4: Common feature set for MM3 with average rank for each
feature.
C−1,1 C−2,0 h13(−1) H(−1) h21(−3)
(1) (3) (7) (22) (22)
g−5(1) C1,0 h22(−3) h31(−2) H(−3)
(35) (40) (41) (42) (49)
Table 5: Common feature set for JPHS with average rank for each
feature.
g0(4) B1 h21(−3) h21(−1) H(−5)
(1) (25) (26) (30) (30)
h13(3) h31(3) g0(5) g3(7) g−3(1)
(34) (52) (61) (61) (65)
Table 6: Common feature set for MBSteg with average rank for each
feature.
C2,−2 C2,2 C−2,2 C2,0 g−2(3)
(4) (6) (10) (10) (24)
g0(4) H(−2) C−1,−2 H(1) H(2)
(27) (31) (32) (36) (50)
Table 7: Common feature set for OutGuess with average rank for
each feature.
C−2,0 H(−2) C−2,−2 C0,−2 h13(0)
(3) (3) (7) (8) (12)
H(−3) C−1,0 h22(1) H(0) g−4(8)
(14) (23) (31) (41) (45)
Table 8: Common feature set for StegHide with average rank for
each feature.
C2,0 C−2,2 C−2,0 B1 B2
(6) (22) (22) (25) (27)
g1(1) h13(5) h21(−3) C−2,−1 g−1(4)
(28) (45) (46) (47) (54)
proposed short analysis of the weaknesses of stego algorithms
is using this interpretation.
4.4.1. F5I . F5 (Table 3) is rather sensitive to both blockiness
detections and, interestingly, is the only of the six tested
algorithms to be sensitive to the variation V. As for other
algorithms, cooccurrence coeﬃcients are triggered.
4.4.2. MM3. MM3 (Table 4) tends to be sensitive to global
histogram features as well as DCT histograms, which are not
preserved.
4.4.3. JPHS. JPHS (Table 5) seems not to preserve the
DCT coeﬃcients histograms. Also the dual histograms react
vividly for center values and extremes ones (−3 and 3).
4.4.4. MBSteg. The features used (Table 6) include global
histograms with values 1, −2, and 2, which happens only
because of the calibration in the feature extraction process.
MBSteg preserves the coeﬃcients’ histograms but does
not take into account a possible calibration. Hence, the
unpreserved histograms are due to the calibration process
in the feature extraction. Information leaks through the
calibration process. Also cooccurrence values are used, which
is a sign that MBSteg does not preserve low and high
frequencies.
4.4.5. OutGuess. Cooccurrence values are mostly used (val-
ues −2, −1) in the feature set for OutGuess (Table 7) and
a clear weak point. The calibration process has also been of
importance since the global histograms of extreme values−3
and −2 have been taken into account.
4.4.6. StegHide. For StegHide (Table 8), blockiness and cooc-
currence values are mostly used, again for low and high
frequencies.
From a general point of view, it can be seen that most
of the analyzed algorithms are sensitive to statistics of
lowpass-calibrated DCT coeﬃcients, represented by features
h13 and h21. This is not surprising since these coeﬃcients
contain a large part of the information of a natural image;
their associated densities are likely to be modified by the
embedding process.
5. Conclusions
This paper has presented a methodology for the estimation
of a suﬃcient number of images for a specific feature set
using the standard deviation of the detection rate obtained
by the classifier as a criterion (a Bootstrap technique is used
for that purpose); the general methodology presented can
nonetheless be extended and applied to other feature sets.
The second step of the methodology aims at reducing the
dimensionality of the data set, by selecting the most relevant
features, according to a Forward selection algorithm; along
with the positive eﬀects of a lower dimensionality, analysis
of the selected features is possible and gives insights on the
steganographic algorithm studied.
Three conclusions can be drawn from the methodology
and experiments in this paper.
(i) Results on standard deviation for almost all studied
steganographic algorithms have proved that the
feature-based steganalysis is reliable and accurate
only if a suﬃcient number of images is used for the
actual training of the classifier used. Indeed, from
most of the results obtained concerning standard
deviation values (and therefore statistical stability of
the results), it is rather irrelevant to possibly increase
detection performance by 2% while working with a
standard deviation for these same results of 2%.
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Table 9: The 40 first features ranked by the Forward algorithm for the F5 algorithm at 5% embedding rate.
h13(0) H(0) B1 V C0,0 g0(2) h31(−1) C2,1 g0(7) C2,−1
g−2(7) g−3(4) B2 h12(−5) g−1(9) g4(5) g5(3) g−4(5) g−4(9) g3(5)
h31(3) h13(1) g−1(6) g−2(1) h13(2) h12(5) g3(6) C1,−2 h13(−5) h22(5)
g−4(1) g4(9) C2,−2 g−3(6) g−5(9) h12(3) h31(0) h21(−4) g2(9) g0(9)
Table 10: The 40 first features ranked by the Forward algorithm for the JPHS algorithm at 5% embedding rate.
g0(4) h22(0) C1,0 B1 H(1) h21(0) g1(4) g0(8) g−2(9) g−2(5)
g4(5) g0(5) g1(9) g−1(2) B2 g2(8) C0,0 h31(5) g0(9) h22(1)
g−2(2) g−1(7) g−3(8) g0(1) h31(−3) h21(−1) h22(−1) g−4(6) C−1,−2 g5(7)
h12(−5) g−5(8) h21(2) g0(7) h12(−2) h22(−4) h31(0) C0,2 H(2) g5(5)
Table 11: The 40 first features ranked by the Forward algorithm for the MBSteg algorithm at 5% embedding rate.
g−2(1) H(2) g−4(7) h13(1) h22(1) C2,−2 C−1,−1 h31(1) g4(7) g−2(4)
h21(0) h31(−4) h21(−4) C0,2 C1,2 h31(−1) H(0) h21(3) g−5(6) h22(−3)
h13(−1) C2,0 C1,2 g5(6) C−2,−1 g−3(6) g5(4) g−2(7) g−1(7) g−4(8)
h22(−1) g2(1) g0(8) h22(−5) H(−2) h12(−4) g5(5) h12(−2) g2(4) h21(−3)
Table 12: The 40 first features ranked by the Forward algorithm for the MM3 algorithm at 5% embedding rate.
C−1,−1 h13(−1) C0,−2 C1,1 g0(9) C2,0 h21(−1) h13(1) g−3(2) C1,0
H(−2) g4(4) g2(2) C−2,0 C0,−1 C−1,−2 g−2(3) h22(−3) g2(3) h13(3)
h31(−1) g−1(9) g−2(8) g0(7) h21(−5) h21(3) C−1,1 g−1(3) g5(3) h31(1)
g0(3) B1 C−2,1 B2 g−4(6) C0,2 H(−1) g2(5) h13(0) g2(7)
Table 13: The 40 first features ranked by the Forward algorithm for the Outguess algorithm at 5% embedding rate.
h13(0) C0,−1 C−2,0 H(−2) B1 C0,−2 g0(7) h31(−3) C−2,−1 g0(2)
B2 H(−1) g−2(2) h13(−1) h22(−1) h22(0) h12(−3) g−2(5) g1(8) h21(−2)
g−2(9) g1(1) H(5) H(4) g2(1) g0(1) g−3(5) g0(9) g−3(8) g−3(3)
g−5(4) g−5(5) C−2,−2 g−1(6) g−2(6) g4(3) C−1,−1 C−1,0 g−2(7) C−1,1
Table 14: The 40 first features ranked by the Forward algorithm for the Steghide algorithm at 5% embedding rate.
C0,−1 g0(2) C0,2 C2,−2 B1 B2 C1,1 C0,−2 C−2,2 h13(−1)
g−5(3) h21(−3) C0,1 h13(0) C1,−1 h31(−1) g−3(3) g3(6) h31(−2) g1(3)
h22(1) C−2,−2 g−4(4) h13(1) C−2,0 g1(4) C2,1 H(−1) C2,2 h22(5)
g2(5) C−1,−1 g1(9) C2,0 g2(7) g−1(1) h31(5) H(−2) h21(1) g−2(9)
(ii) Through the second step of the methodology, the
required number of features for steganalysis can
be decreased. This with three main advantages: (a)
performances remain the same if the reduced feature
set is properly constructed; (b) the selected features
from the reduced set are relevant and meaningful
(the selected set can possibly vary, according to the
feature selection technique used) and make reverse-
engineering possible; (c) the weaknesses of the stego
algorithm also appear from the selection; this can
lead, for example, to improvements of the stego
algorithm.
(iii) The analysis on the reduced common feature sets
obtained between embedding rates of the same stego
algorithm shows that the algorithms are sensitive to
roughly the same features, as a basis. Meanwhile,
when embedding rates get as low as 5%, or for
very eﬃcient algorithms, some very specific features
appear.
Hence, the first step of the methodology is a requirement
for not only any new stego algorithm but also new feature
sets/steganalyzers, willing to present its performances: a
suﬃcient number of images for the stego algorithm and the
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steganalyzer used to test it have to be assessed in order to have
stable results (i.e., with a small enough standard deviation of
its results to make the comparison with current state of the
art techniques meaningful).
Also, from the second step of the methodology, the most
relevant features can be obtained and make possible a further
analysis of the stego algorithm considered, additionally to the
detection rate obtained by the steganalyzer.
Appendix
Features Ranked by the Forward Algorithm
In appendix are given the first 40 features obtained by
the Forward ranking for each stego algorithm with 5%
embedding rate (Tables 9–14). Only one embedding rate
result is given for space reasons. 5% embedding rate results
have been chosen since they tend to be diﬀerent (in terms
of ranked features by the Forward algorithm) from the other
embedding rates and also because 5% embedding rate is a
diﬃcult challenge in terms of steganalysis; these features are
meaningful for this kind of diﬃcult steganalysis with these
six algorithms.
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